The Brazilian Amazon and Cerrado biomes have been subject to strong pressure from agricultural expansion over the past decades. It is frequently claimed that the associated tree cover loss was partly driven by land speculation. 
I. Introduction
At a global scale land resources are subject to strong pressure to fulfill the world's demand for agricultural products (Tilman et al., 2011; Leblois et al., 2017) . In this context, Brazil represents a major player to satisfy local and global needs. It holds a vast amount of land resources, while at the same time its agricultural sector has grown due to productivity improvements and structural adjustments (OECD, 2015) . Yet, global and local demands for products such as soy and beef enhance expansion of the agricultural frontier into natural vegetation (McAlpine et al., 2009; Karstensen et al., 2013) with considerable environmental tradeoffs of major concern for policymakers (Nepstad et al., 2013) . In this paper, we want to contribute to a better understanding of the incentives that affect land conversion decisions in Brazil by looking at the effects of land speculation, and conservation policies in land markets.
A better understanding of Brazilian land markets can reveal information on the incentives of deforestation and related speculative behavior (Margulis, 2003; Merry et al., 2008; Sills and Caviglia-Harris, 2009 ). Conversion of natural vegetation in the Brazilian forest frontier is a quest for claiming land. Asset accumulation in land is common by colonist agents in these areas; many with the objective to occupy properties to sell once a land market emerges (Caldas et al., 2007) . Typically, land in the Amazon has been relatively cheap compared to other areas and was subject to little law enforcement on illegal conversion and related ownership up-to mid-2000s. During the 1970s and 1980s small farmers in the south transferred their demand for land to the north contributing to rising land prices, and pushing landless settlers and expansive cattle ranching further into frontier areas (Margulis, 2003) .
With the advancement of the agricultural frontier, land prices rise inducing land speculation in a context where land markets do not depend on the presence of formal land titles (Reydon, 2011; Holland et al., 2016; Barreto et al., 2013) . Speculation in Brazilian frontier areas happen when forest is converted to pastureland, as a mean to secure land ownership, and later expect to profit from selling the land when the cropland frontier advances, or by increasing production as infrastructure improves (Strassburg et al., 2014; Barreto et al., 2008) . Besides the profitability of beef production, forest conversion into pasture is fueled by factors such as: establishment of land ownership of cleared land (Reydon, 2011) , capture of land rents identified by ranchers created by altered economic conditions (Walker et al., 2009) , and land speculation (Hecht, 1985; Fearnside, 2002; Margulis, 2003) . It comes with no surprise that in the Brazilian Amazon pastureland has been identified as culprit of most cumulative direct deforestation in the past decades (Chomitz and Thomas, 2001; Zaks et al., 2009; Barona et al., 2010) . Planned improvements in infrastructure also fuel speculative behavior in the Amazon (Laurance et al., 2004; Hecht and Mann, 2008) , as an increase on the demand for land by different agents is expected. As the productive potential of cattle ranching in forest areas increases, we would expect that land selling prices will also rise. A speculative behavior, we hypothesis, would enhance this increase in forestland prices.
The great expansion of the agricultural frontier in the Amazon biome raised environmental concerns by the Brazilian Federal Government during the 2000s. Legal protection of forestland resources has existed since 1934 by the creation of the Forest Code ); yet, the real breakthrough in conservation governance came in 2004 when it was launched the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm). This plan called for actions on land tenure regularization, improve monitoring and control for conservation compliance, use of economic incentives for sustainable agriculture and forest management, and environmental sustainability guidelines for infrastructure projects (May et al., 2011; Gebara and Thuault, 2013) . Additionally, the different levels of government increased the extension of areas protected, as well as those of conservation units . Interventions in the supply chain followed. In July 2006 major soybean traders sign an agreement to not buy products from areas deforested after that year, the so-called Soy Moratorium (Gibbs et al., 2015) . Further efforts to halt deforestation were made in 2008 with the creation of a priority list in which those districts with historic high rates of deforestation were subject to special conservation enforcement until some conservation milestones were achieved (Cisneros et al., 2015) . As a result by 2016, deforestation was reduced in 71% compared with its levels in 2004 (INPE, 2017 ; a success related to this innovative conservation governance and supply chain interventions (Nepstad et al., 2014; Arima et al., 2014; Cisneros et al., 2015) . Despite this apparent conservation success, it exists concerns regarding the presence of conservation policy leakage.
1 Great efforts to reduce deforestation from agriculture and cattle ranching within the Amazon biome might cause higher pressure in relatively less protected areas like the Cerrado savannah (Gibbs et al., 2015; Oliveira and Hecht, 2015) . 2 Moreover, 1 Other concerns beyond the scope of our analysis had been highlighted: tradeoffs between environmental law compliance and agricultural production (Sparovek et al., 2012; Nepstad et al., 2014) ; less credibility of law enforcement as amnesty was offer to some offenders in recent revisions of the law ; or the importance of macroeconomic factors (Santana and Nascimento, 2012; Richards et al., 2012; Almeida de Menezes and Piketty, 2012; Macedo et al., 2012) . 2 Cerrado savannah is the second largest biome in the country hosting an important biodiversity richness (Ratter et al., 1997) . It also highly susceptible to infrastructure improvement, as it can considerably increase agricultural productivity in this area (Rada, 2013) .
agri-business expansion into already cleared areas can push cattle ranching into frontier areas (Lapola et al., 2010; Arima et al., 2011; Richards et al., 2014) . Within a stringent conservation context, lower profits and lower likelihood of land titling from illegal clearance are expected; thus, the cost of clearance in the Amazon would level with that in other biomes shifting incentives for clearance in areas like Cerrado. Such type of leakage has been described as outto-out leakage (Fearnside, 2009; Soares-Filho et al., 2010) , in which land-grabbers once prone to deforest in the Amazon would redirect their attention to less protected areas after a stringent conservation is in place.
Land markets can reflect potential leakage effects of conservation. Under PCCDAm, offenders are linked to remotely-sensed deforestation patches, and if liability is established, they could be subject to confiscation of assets, monetary fines, or cross-compliance mechanisms such as conditional access to credit and commercialization channels . This set of measures makes harder for new settlers to claim ownership on illegally deforested areas, and thus reduces the expected profits envisioned by the conversion. Further, regularization of public land by extending protected areas reduces the likelihood of those areas of ever receive a title for the land, discouraging a speculative behavior (Nepstad et al., 2014) . We expect that land prices incorporate the effect of conservation policies by reducing the value of land as the likelihood of its expected net profits reduces, but increasing the value in areas not subject to stringent conservation.
In this paper, we use forestland prices as an indicator of shifting land demand and related speculative behavior. We then test the impacts of conservation, as we hypothesized that changes in forestland prices can be seen as a symptom of leakage in which deforestation is its consequence. The analysis is founded on land rent theory and hedonic theory valuation of land. We aim to answer the question: do forestland prices convey information on future land conversion?
The paper is divided into five sections. Our first section is the present introduction to the topic of land markets, speculation, conservation and potential leakage effects in Brazil. The following section describes the theoretical framework in which forestland prices are analyzed.
The third section lays out the empirical approach implemented and provides an explanation of the data used in our analysis. A fourth section presents our results on the effect of speculation and conservation in forestland prices. Followed by a discussion and a conclusion section based on our results.
II. Theoretical Framework

II.1. Land rent and forest conservation
Land rent theory interprets how access to relevant markets affects land rents, land use, and rural landscape differentiation (Holland et al., 2016) . Key assumptions of this theory are that land rents are a function of a) distance to sources of trade or relevant markets (Thünian notion), and b) land productivity (Ricardian notion) determined by bio-geophysical factors (e.g. topography, soil fertility, climate conditions) (Munroe et al., 2002) and agricultural practices. Thus this theory offers insights on impacts of political economy into loss of tropical forest by exemplifying a policy process and its effect on land rents and landscape, and related incentives faced by landowners (Walker et al., 2009 ).
Following Angelsen (2010) , land rents are accrued from a use h of land at location i at time t as a diminishing function of distance to relevant markets. 3 In this model, land is set into production to a use h that brings higher rents. Incentives to expand land uses into forest areas will exist until they bring zero rents. If one observes a case in which markets are functioning properly, then "…land rent will be equal to the net [to costs] yield of the highest and best use of the land" (Mendelsohn et al., 1994 p. 755) . The shock is represented by shifting land rent lines outwards from the origin due to, for instance, infrastructure improvements and higher agricultural prices. With a higher conservation enforcement, expansion towards forested areas will be lower in this scenario Fig 1) .
This model represents a key idea behind expectations of profitability of land with and without conservation policies. If an infrastructure improvement is planned but a stringent conservation is in place; then the expected rents will be reduce dissuading speculative behavior. We use the intuition behind land rent theory to explain forestland prices and associated incentives for landscape development in Brazil. In the next section, we use a present value perspective on rents as a framework to understand forestland prices.
II.2. Forestland price
Following a land rent model perspective, forestland is converted to pastureland when it brings higher rental incomes ( Fig. 1 above) . In the present analysis is assumed that decision of conversion of forestland will happen in the future which brings uncertainty on expected rent incomes; thus different land use patterns must be considered. Using a present value formulation on net land rents (Shiller, 1981; Burt, 1986; Tegene and Kuchler, 1991; Engsted, 1998) forestland prices can be expressed as:
In eq (1) the price of forestland at location i at time t, , is the sum of expected discounted stream of forestland rent, , and discounted stream of pastureland rent, , net of the expected discounted conversion costs, . This structural equation allows us to decompose different aspects that affect forestland prices.
A first element is given by the expected stream of forestland rents. When land is left as forest at the end of time t, its rents equal the marginal productivity net of transportation costs, (as proposed in the von Thünen model). We assume a probability that forestland is converted to pastureland at the beginning of time t. Decisions are faced with a discount rate . To reduce complexity one can make the strong assumption that , , and are constant over
time. An additional assumption made is that forestland rent income occurs only when forestland has not been converted to pastureland, thus one can express the forestland rent element as:
Expected stream of pastureland rent income is the second element of forestland prices.
Pastureland rent income occurs on original forest land only after the land has been converted to pasture land. If we again assume that probability of conversion, interest rate, and pastureland net rents are constant over time we obtain:
Which can be simplified to:
The third element, conversion costs are assumed to be constant in time and space, and only occur at the time of the conversion from forest to pasture land. They can be expressed as:
With the calculations from above, we obtain the price of forestland, including the value and cost of converting the land to pastureland as follow:
When conversion probability equals zero, then forestland price is no longer as in equation (5); instead, one obtains a forestland price that only considers the stream rents of forestland (i.e. = = + ).
II.3. Comparative static analysis
In order to derive testable hypothesis, we calculate the total derivative of forestland prices after some key components. Here with the assumption that land prices capture expected rents from forest conversion. The alternative would be that land conversion is not reflected in forestland prices and only determined by rental prices. Based on our theoretical model and the objective in this paper we are interested in two main components. First, the conversion probability is considered in our model as the main source of a speculative behavior. If high expectations exist of ripping profits from conversion to pastureland, then would be close to or equal to 1. However, in a more stringent conservation scenario, we would expect a smaller likelihood of pastureland conversion even if it might be profitable. Taking the derivate of the forestland price with respect to (and without indexes to ease explanation), we obtain:
The expression is always positive if − 1+ ≥ . Hence, whenever the pasture rent net of the discounted conversion costs is higher than the forest rent (i.e. it would be profitable to convert the land), higher protection stringency (lower ) leads to lower forest land prices.
The second component of interest is the effect of a change in conversion costs . Taking the derivate of the relative forest price after the conversion costs, we get:
which is always negative. Thus, higher conversion costs such as areas with dense vegetation, or subject to de facto collected fines, reduce the relative price of forest land.
In the next section, we explained our empirical approach to test the hypothesis that forest prices convey information on future land conversion with sign tests as presented in Table 1 . 
Conversion costs -0
Note: The signs for the anticipation case partially depend on the assumption that (pure) forestland rents are (sufficiently) lower than pure rents from pastureland which is a common case for consolidated frontier areas as well as land that is expected to become part of a consolidated frontier area.
III. Empirical Strategy and Data Sources
III.1. Reduced-form Model
In our empirical strategy, we aim to test the hypothesis that forestland prices convey information on future land conversion. To achieve our objective we need to decompose land prices into its different components, mainly the probability of conversion and the conversion costs. We used an econometric panel model to evaluate the relative importance of attributes influencing forestland prices based on hedonic theory (first exposed by Rosen (1974) ). The hedonic modeling rest on the key assumption that the price of a parcel of land is the sum of the unobserved prices of a bundle of attributes associated with that good (Snyder et al., 2008) , allowing the possibility to account for heterogeneity in the quality of land (Chicoine, 1981) .
The fundamental hedonic equation is = ℎ( ). In which ℎ(•) represents a functional relationship between the forestland price and its different attributes, . One can derive the marginal implicit price, / = ℎ( )/ , for each attribute which represents the additional value people would pay for a small change in the specific attribute (Ma and Swinton, 2011; Shultz and King, 2001; Snyder et al., 2008 ).
This approach is also attractive as we cannot observe the key components of the theoretical model. We then investigate the effect of some relevant attributes that strongly influence those relevant components. Thus our strategy evaluates the transformation on levels of certain attributes that influence land prices (Sills and Caviglia-Harris, 2009 ).
Our reduced-form model of forestland price is given by the following equation:
We applied a first difference (FD) econometric model (Wooldridge, 2007) to equation (8) to test whether forestland prices convey information on future land conversion. Here represents forestland prices at district i at time t, and it is a function of different attributes which are averaged at the district level. First, we include , a vector of n attributes related to land rents and conversion costs. Second, a vector of j attributes with influence on the probability of conversion, i.e. our indicator of speculation (see Data section below). We also include an "initial condition", , that is related to costs of conversion. This term is interacted with time variable t to keep it in our econometric estimation after taking first difference (Cisneros et al., 2015) . In our different specifications, we also include a vector of trend dummies for each period analyzed. Finally, forestland prices are influenced by an unobserved heterogeneity term for each district and an idiosyncratic error, .
We used equation eight as based on different specifications of our model. In each specification, the dependent variable is the log transformation of average forestland prices.
The first specification only considers those attributes that affect land rents and disentangles the effect of speculation. Three additional specifications include the impact of conservation mechanisms to test further existence of land conversion information, and conservation policy leakage in forestland prices. Below we elaborate further on the different attributes considered in our empirical estimation.
III.2. Data
For our empirical approach, we used the district as unit of analysis. From the approximately 5.5 thousand districts in the entire country, we analyzed 1,456 for which forestland price information was available, and that are located within the Amazon and/or Cerrado biomes (see Figure 2 ).
The timeframe of our study goes from 2001 till 2012. This period allows us to see changes in land speculation and conservation policy leakage before and after the innovative conservation governance implemented in the mid-2000s. At the time of the analysis some of the variables were not available for more recent years, therefore a practical reason bound us also to this timeframe.
III.2.a.
Land Prices
We used forestland selling prices as dependent variable in our different model specifications.
The information was obtained from Informa Economics FNP (http://fnp.com.br/), an agribusiness consulting company. The information is divided in micro-regions developed by FNP; we then imputed to each district the average value of its representative region. In the original information, three types of land are distinguished: cropland, pastureland and natural land cover (forestland). In our empirical analysis, we deflated average regional values to 2001 values using Brazil's General Price Index-Internal Availability (IGP-DI). We also test our model using an interpolation of our dependent variable similar to Richards et al. (2014) , but as we obtained consistent results we only reported those of our original variable.
Figure 2. Area of study and persistent speculative areas
Note: This map draws those regions of interest: Amazon and Cerrado biomes, the Brazilian Legal Amazon (PPCDAm's area of influence), and the priority list districts. It also shows persistent speculative areas, i.e. areas with reduced travel times from forest areas to roads due to expected improvements in road infrastructure throughout the period of analysis.
III.2.b.
Rent and conversion costs attributes
A set of attributes are included to control for land rents that can be ripped from conversion of forestland. First, we created an aggregate Paasche crop price index that includes all seasonal and temporal crops using information from the municipality annual agricultural survey of Brazil (Produção Agrícola Municipal -PAM in Portuguese). We used 2001 as based year. We include this attribute as we expect it to influence average rents of converted forestland in a district. A second attribute is given by current fuel prices. The information was obtained from the Brazilian National Agency for Oil, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP in Portuguese). We considered prices on oil fuel, diesel, and ethanol. The data is available as a monthly average record which was translated as an average yearly price of the three types of fuels from 2001 till 2012. 4 Around 10% (or 560) of total municipalities analyzed have a record on fuel prices.
Using the location of municipality capitals, we calculate an average fuel price for the rest of municipalities by assigning the average value of the nearest 5 neighbors with a record on fuel prices. We deflated fuel prices to values in 2001 using the IGP-DI. This attribute, we assume, influence negatively rent components of converted land (as input for production), and positively the component of costs of conversion (as input for forest clearance machinery).
Number of environmental fines within a district issued by the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) were also included as we assumed that a higher density of fines would affect potential conversion costs and thus land conversion decisions.
Average accessibility from forest to roads within a district was included to account for location impacts on rents (a discussion on its calculation is offered in the Speculation section below). We also included the proportion of soy suitability area within non-forest patches in a district. This variable was obtained from Soares Filho et al. (2016) as raster format and we aggregated at district level using a Geographic Information System (GIS). It considers biophysical characteristics like slope, soils, and climate zones (Gibbs et al., 2015) that favor soy production in particular, and agriculture in general. We consider it as a proxy to control for in situ potential rents and the impact of agriculture development within a district. As initial condition, we measured proportion of tree forest cover area within a district at the beginning of the period. We obtain this variable from Hansen et al. (2013) . We assume that it would influence positively the costs of conversion, as dense forest areas are harder to reach making clearance more costly (Andersen, 1996; Margulis, 2003) .
III.2.c.
Speculative attribute
In Brazil, construction of new roads has been linked to land conversion and land speculation since the beginning of the Amazon colonization till today (Hecht, 1985; Pfaff, 1999; SoaresFilho et al., 2006; Fearnside, 2008) . To account for this effect on forestland prices we constructed an indicator on the expected impact on travel time from forest areas to roads (EIR) due to road network development. To construct our indicator we first measured a district's average accessibility to existing roads from forest areas in time units. We created two layers of accessibility for each year, one calculated with factual roads, and another one including also planned or improved roads. To construct these variables different steps were needed. First, a friction map was created using information on land cover, roads, water bodies and the effect of slope. Land cover was classified as areas with primary forest, secondary forest, and non-forest with data made by Hansen et al. (2013) . Historical road network information was obtained from Brazil's National Department of Transport Infrastructure (DNIT). Accessibility to roads in hours was calculated using a Knight's move algorithm from standard GIS software. We calculated the mean accessibility value for each district from both layers. Finally, we calculated the difference between the two measures of accessibility and use it in our model as indicator of speculation. As illustration, in Figure 2 we depicted those areas that for all years were potentially subject to speculation due to road development.
III.2.d.
Stringent conservation attributes
Since the mid-2000s, a stringent environmental governance was implemented in Brazil, particularly to protect the Amazon Biome. 5 To test the impact of these conservation policies on land markets, we included three different specifications of our model for each conservation policy measured. First, we include the effect of two major changes in conservation governance: the PCCDAm (government sector), and the Soy Moratorium (private sector). We created temporal shock variables with post-2004 and post-2006 respectively. Finally, we included a dummy variable for those districts that enter a priority list commonly known as "blacklist" (Cisneros et al., 2015) . Based on our theoretical model, we would expect lower forestland prices in those areas with stringent conservation. If a conservation policy leakage is present, we also expect that forestland prices rise in areas not subject to a stringent conservation.
IV. Results
IV.1. Descriptive analysis
In figure 3 we depicted the development of forestland prices and deforestation rates for three groups of districts: only Amazon forest, only Cerrado savannah, or those that hold both biomes within their boundaries. The lower graph in figure 3 illustrates deforestation rates measured as the percentage change of total forest tree cover within the three types of districts (Hansen et al., 2013) . 
IV.2. Model 1 -Speculative component
We aim to test the hypothesis that forestland prices convey information on future land conversion. Based on our theoretical model and hypothesis related, we expect to find information on land conversion if some relevant components are affecting forestland prices.
Here we are mainly interested in the impact of the probability of conversion, as we assumed is the major source of speculation. We applied a first difference model to our reduced-form model in equation 8. We applied a log transformation to our dependent variable as well as to our covariates. Our results are summarized in Table 2 .
In the first column, we present a first specification that only considers attributes that affect rents and conversion costs components of land prices. Our different attributes are related to forestland prices as expected. In a district with lower prices received for agricultural production, or faced with higher input prices (fuel prices) in a remote location (accessibility), one would expect on average lower forestland prices. A higher concentration of environmental fines is correlated with lower forestland prices, supporting our hypothesis of increasing conversion costs. This effect might also show that a higher incidence of fines is related to the credibility of law enforcement and thus reducing expected profitability of conversion. Our initial condition measure, proportion of tree cover within a district, shows a strong negative relationship with forestland prices. This relationship reinforces common knowledge that dense forest areas will be less valued, and thus subject to less conversion pressure. The second column includes our indicator of speculation, EIR, in our model. Our estimated coefficient is positively related to land prices and highly significant at the 1% level. On average in a district, with a hundred percent change in the reduction of time required to reach a road from a forest, forestland increase in 8% percent its value. This finding suggests that road development indeed fueled land speculation in Brazil, and it is a symptom reflected in land markets.
Our first results offer some evidence that forestland prices do convey information on land conversion. To reinforce our findings in the next section we show our results after we test the impact of conservation policies and its related leakage effects on land prices.
IV.3. Model 2 -Stringent conservation
To further test if forestland prices convey information on future land conversions, we made three further specifications of our based model by adding up conservation governance shocks that have the Brazilian Amazon as main focus. Our results are presented in Table 3 (see Annex I for complementary results). From left to right, the columns show the effects of PPCDAm, the soy moratorium, and the priority list. Our previous results were maintained in these new model specifications. Particularly our indicator of speculation kept its significance and magnitude on its relationship with forestland prices.
As expected, all conservation governance shocks showed similar results in forestland prices.
All our measured effects are significant at the 1% level with a positive effect on land prices. Equally interesting is the effect of a stringent conservation on areas only within the Brazilian Legal Amazon. Our results suggest that forestland prices increased less in areas subject to stringer conservation, vis-à-vis areas outside an increase law enforcement. However, one can see that this reduction in forestland prices is not enough to outweigh the impact of a speculative behavior. If we include the impact of PPCDAm in our model, a reduction of 0.4% was observed within the focus area of the policy. Meanwhile, an improvement in one percent on accessibility from forest to roads increase forestland prices by 0.08%. A similar but higher effect was presented by the implementation of a soy moratorium, in which a reduction of 0.65% in forestland prices is related to its establishment.
Our results point to the existence of a conservation policy leakage reflected in land markets.
On one side, efforts of conservation might induce unwanted incentives by increasing prices on land markets. On the other, by only focusing on certain regions land prices are only partially tamed, and in under protected regions, one could observe deforestation as a consequence. 
V. Discussion and Conclusions
In our study, we wanted to test the hypothesis that forestland prices convey information on future land conversion. With that aim in mind, this paper also contributed to the understanding of those mechanisms that affect land speculation and conservation policy leakage effects by analyzing land markets in Brazil. In accordance with other studies, we found that both speculation and leakage play a role in land use decisions. Moreover, our results suggest that land markets can serve as an indicator for spatially and temporally shifting land demand in Brazil. Our findings showed with highly significant levels that forestland prices indeed carry information on future decisions of conversion. Our indicator of speculation is related to an increase in forestland prices, yet its magnitude is lower compared with attributes affecting land rents and conversion costs. This can be a clear underestimation of the speculative component of land prices by our analysis. Further extensions of our research can be pointed to include other relevant attributes that can fuel or discourage speculation, like those related to poor land governance. Our indicator of speculation also does not account the effect of secondary roads due to data limitations. These endogenous roads can also boost land speculation in frontier areas.
Our analysis shows a consistent effect when tested different conservation mechanisms. All pointed to an increase in forestland prices in general but a reduction in prices within areas subject to stronger law enforcement. This results might reflect an increase in the race for grabbing land before conservation is de facto enforced, and thus making it harder to claim land rights from illegal forest conversion. This also suggests the presence of conservation policy leakage in the area of study. As with our speculation attribute, our conservation measurement might overestimate the effects of conservation policies. Location and available resources play a crucial role to enforce environmental laws, therefore in practice, the effectiveness of enforcement is heterogeneous across the Brazilian Legal Amazon .
In the past decade, Brazil achieved a considerable reduction in deforestation through implementing an innovative conservation governance with main focus in the Brazilian Amazon biome. However, reforms to the Forest Code in 2012 and recent backdrops to conservation achievements (e.g. reduction of protected areas) reemphasize the shaking grounds in which conservation success is based. With a relaxed conservation governance, it is expected that development of infrastructure projects like dams, mines or roads bring speculative behavior with related deforestation. Moreover, neglecting a strong conservation governance in other biomes can bring unwanted conservation policy leakage effects.
It is imperative to further understand the economic incentives that shaped landscapes in highly dynamic contexts like the one in Brazil. The Southern American country does hold important land resources that can make the difference for local and global well-being by mitigating climate change gas emissions, by producing important farming products, or by regulating important local and regional ecosystem services. Understanding the effects of speculation, and the role of unprotected biomes in the land use change process can hold one piece of the puzzle to reach integrative solutions. We hope that future research efforts can offer more answers on how to manage different objectives of development and conservation in which land and its uses play an anchor role in finding synergic outcomes. The table reports first difference estimates with change in the log of average forestland price as dependent variable. Standard errors, clustered at district level, are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level, respectively.
Annex I -Forestland prices, speculation and conservation model First Difference Model
 refers to a rescaling of the coefficient by 100.
